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1.0 PROLOGUE
The Group Task Force on Satellite Rescue and Repair was formed as a task force of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Advisory Council to
review policies, pricing, and implementation for undertaking unanticipated satellite
rescue and repair missions utilizing the Space Shuttle. In the course of this review,
the Group became concerned about the execution and public perception of such
missions. This Prologue discusses these concerns.
Rescue missions of any kind, whether on land, at sea, or in space, have many
common characteristics. One of the most important of these characteristics is
uncertainty. The necessity for rescue implies all is not well. It follows that in
planning the rescue, a number of contingency actions must be kept in mind. Even in
more common rescue attempts on land or at sea, the initial approach does not always
succeed. The more extreme the situation, the more likely that several attempts at
rescue will be needed before final success is achieved or final failure admitted.
With respect to the use of the Space Shuttle for unanticipated satellite rescue and
repair missions, it is clear that the satellite involved must not only be in an orbit
reachable by the Shuttle, but that the orbit must be stable for an extended period. On
past attempts, the time required has ranged from four to 30 months. This specific
time interval is mission-dependent and is determined by the duration of the
planning, engineering, and training cycle required to verify safety and increase the
likelihood of success as much as is practical. A virtue of this external cycle is that
this "experience" enhances the possibility that the "ad hoc" activities usually required
in successful missions can be evolved as needed. Historically, such "ad hoc" activities
are needed to complete rescue and repair missions successfully.
Thus the success of satellite rescue and repair missions must be based on the final
outcome. Anticipation of success must be tempered by the realpossibility of failure;
the failure of a particular attempt is just that. To offer judgement prior to either
success_l completion or admitted failure of the entire mission suggests a naive and
an unrealistic point of view. The Group Task Force_on Satellite_Rescue and Repair
': came _[0 fully appreciate this subtlety only after itstudied the issue. We feel strongly
that if nothing else comes from this study but recognition of this definition of mission
success or failure, then an important contribution has been made by' calling this
definition to the world at large.
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
The Group Task Force was chartered by the Administrator of NASA to recommend
"a policy outlining the criteria, the design standards and the pricing model to guide
NASA in assessing the responsibilities for government and nongovernment Satellite
Rescue and Repair Missions." Criteria for accepting such missions, risks and benefits
to all sectors of our economy involved in satellite services, adequacy of planning and
. training, and the impact on NASA's primary missions were reviewed.
The Group began by asking a more fundamental question; is satellite rescue and
repair a logical element of NASA's mission? Factors considered were:
• The probability of rescue or repair opportunities arising
• The economic justification for such attempts
• The benefits to NASA, both from such ad hoc learning experiences in space
operations and the impact on the public perception of NASA
• The effect of such unanticipated missions on NASA's scheduled activities
• Any potential, effect on NASA's technical capability to work in space
• Any potential effect on U.S. economic competitiveness
2,1 Background
After the decision to develop the Space Shuttle was made in the early 1970s,
national space policy evolved to take advantage of the initial Shuttle projected
..... launch rate capability of up to 60 missions per year, and a low cost of less than
: $20 million per launch. A high payloa d traffic model was projected and, to
assure maximum use of the Shuttle, the Administration mandated that virtually
all U.S. satellites -- NASA, Department of Defense (DoD), National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and commercial -- be launched by the
Shuttle. The family of Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs) -- Atlas, Delta, and
Titan - was to be phased out.
:_NASA envisioned that extra vehicular operations in space would become
i _,,_: routine. Selected NASAsatellites (e.g,, the Hubble Space Telescope(fiST)) were
;:_,:_:_i::_designed to be servicedion-orbit for both scheduled an d unanticipated ....
:_maintenance. Rescuing satellites appeared a logical mission for the Shuttle.
But reality did not follow policy. Projected launch rates were not reali_d -12
missions per year is the current Shuttle launch capability. The early traffic
model also proved to be optimistic - 10 to 20 satellite launches per year is a
more realistic projection of requirements for the foreseeable future. Shuttle costs
have proven to be significantly higher than anticipated by the original costing
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model. At the same time, foreign ELVs (Ariane, Long March, etc.) have become
more competitive with U.S. ELVs.
In terms of policy, the range of missions considered for flight on Shuttle was
significantly impacted by the fundamental evaluation of National Space Policy
which occurred following the Challenger accident. The policy which emerged
from that process limited the Shuttle to missions which require human presence,
other unique Shuttle capabilities, or which require Shuttle use for national
security, foreign policy, or other compelling reasons. Unless they meet these
criteria, no DoD or commercial payloads are flown on the Shuttle. This shift led
to the reemphasis on U.S. ELVs to launch these satellites.
Four rescue/repair missions have been conducted to date. Three of the five
satellites involved in these missions were launched by the Shuttle (one mission
rescued two satellites). The most recent satellite to be rescued, an Intelsat VI,
was launched on a Titan. It was later maneuvered into a Shuttle-compatible
orbit using propellant available aboard the satellite. Four of the five rescues
required real-time replanning due to difficulties encountered during the rescue
operation. All five satellites were ultimately rescued.
By the end of this decade, the needs of Space Station Freedom will take priority
on the Shuttle manifest, essentially dominating the schedule. The priorifization
of satellite rescue and repair must be addressed within this new environment.
2.2 Present Trends
Today, commercial and DoD satellites are launched on ELVs, either domestic or
foreign. This fact calls attention to certain technical issues that define the limits
of a satellite rescue by a manned Shuttle mission. These issues are:
. The Low Earth Orbit (LEO) parking orbits achieved by satellites launched
on ELVs must be compatible with Shuttle orbits or the satellites must be
maneuverable into a Shuttle orbit.
2. The launch failure must occur at insertion from LEO to the desired orbit or,
if after insertion, the spacecraft must have enough expendable on-board
propellant to achieve a :Shuttle- compatible orbit.:
" 3. Unmanned spacecraft are not required to be man-rated unless launched
• • from the Shuttle. Saf tetetete_interlocks, hand holds, and maintainability
• features appear to be an unacceptable overhead for unmanned payloads.
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As a result, the demand and opportunity for satellite rescue and repair is
anticipated to be quite limited. We estimate only one percent of the total
satellites to be launched will become candidates for rescue and repair.
Scientific payloads have also reflected a shift in policy. After a decade of
"bigger is better," the trend is toward a larger number of smaller satellites.
These smaller satellites are designed to require no on-orbit maintenance.
Experience has shown that a spacecraft designed for on-orbit maintenance is
roughly 20 percent more expensive to develop and the cost of maintaining a
logistic capability for the life of the satellite becomes significant. Some scientists
believe that for this emerging class of payloads, the probability that adequate
data can be collected over the life of a scientific satellite is high enough to accept
the risk of a maintenance-free life. In addition, launching on ELVs can provide
greater schedule flexibility while the elimination of a maintenance requirement
offers a broader range of possible orbits.
Nevertheless, the Shuttle should continue to support those science payloads,
such as the HST, designed to be serviced to prolong life, enable mission
enhancement, or recover space experiments for detailed study on earth.
2.3 Other Considerations
If the full cost of a Shuttle mission were charged for a rescue, the economic
benefit to either the manufacturer, the owner, or the insurer would be greatly
diminished. It should also be noted that, to date, the availability of satellite
rescue has had virtually no effect on the satellite or insurance industries which
have balanced risk of failure against ir_urance cost.
/
As noted above, the Shuttle manifest will become dominated by Space Station
Freedom. Any required rescue missions would need to be inserted into the
manifest, involve additional crew training, and, potentially, displace planned
payloads. In addition, rescue mission experience illustrates a continuing
problem in ground-based simulations and analysis of on-orbit activities.
The case has been made that the lessons learned from the:rescue missions have
significantlycontributed to our understanding of how to operate in space.
Properly documented and Communicated, these lessons:can be valuable
resources. Future satellite rescue and repair missions will add incrementally to
:_ this body of knowledge. NASA must also take ,full advantage of the lessons
learned to date: Nevertheless, displacing well-planned extravehicular activity
(EVA) experiments by ad hocEVA activities associated with the satellite rescue
or repair will usually result in a net loss in understanding operations in space.
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A final consideration is the effect on the public perception of NASA and,
therefore, national support for its mission. In the case of the previous five
rescues, the pre-mission publicity that defined "success" committed NASA, and
the Shuttle crew, to capture the satellite and either repair it or return it to Earth.
As mentioned above, four of the rescues encountered significant obstacles.
Although the ultimate success of each of these missions did provide a short-term
boost to NASA's public image, the negative publicity which would have
resulted from an unsuccessful rescue attempt must not be discounted. Had the
Intelsat VI rescue not succeeded despite repeated attempts, NASA would
certainly have been subjected to considerable criticism. A concerted effort
should be made to educate the public to both the difficulties involved in
conducting such a mission and the knowledge that can be gained even if the
rescue and repair operation is not completed.
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3.0 EVOLUTION OF SHUTTLE USE
In July of 1969 the Apollo Space Program successfully achieved its goal of landing
men on the Moon and returning them safely to Earth. America was looking toward
its future in space. In the same year, Vice President Spiro Agnew appointed a Space
Task Group to define a post-Apollo Space Program for the United States. The
committee issued the following recommendation: "The next logical step for us to take
in space will be to create permanent space stations in Earth and lunar orbits with
low-cost access by reusable chemical and nuclear rocket transportation systems in
assembling our capacity to explore the planet Mars with men thereby initiating man's
permanent occupancy of outer space."
At the time, budget constraints prevented the United States from pursuing the
proposed plan: concurrent development of the Shuttle, a space station, and human
planetary exploration. However, a reusable space transportation system which could
meet all of NASA's launch requirements as well as those of the DoD, commercial and
possibly international customers at a reduced cost (due to the reusability of the
system) would make economic sense in light of the perceived high cost of expendable
launch systems. In addition, the 12 different types of expendable launchers available
at that time made the idea of one reusable system to meet all needs attractive. NASA
contracted with Mathematica 1 to assess the cost effectiveness of such a reusable space
transportation system. The report stated that the principal objectives of the Space
Shuttle system were:
1. A new capability of meeting all foreseeable space missions in NASA, DoD
and elsewhere, including manned space flight capabilities.
. Reduction of space program costs (manned, unmanned, NASA, DoD,
commercial users) over the present expendable space transportation costs
through reuse, refurbishment, maintenance, and updating of payloads.
3. Reduction of space transportation costs for all missions (low energy, high
energy, manned)
4. Option of later transition to a fully reusable system.
5. A low non-recurring cost to meet funding constraints.
Economic Analysis of the Space Shuttle System, Mathematica, Inc., NASW-2081,
January 1972
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6. Assurance of a low cost per launch of below $10 million and if possible $5
million - justifiable when payload costs and effects are considered.
It should be noted that a reusable space tug was considered to be part of the
program as a system for delivering payloads to and from a Shuttle-achievable orbit.
Projected high development costs forced NASA to abandon initial design concepts
which featured fully reusable vehides. The decision was made to dispose of the
giant external fuel tank with each mission -- this is the Shuttle configuration flying
today.
In April 1981 the Shuttle Columbia flew the Space Shuttle Program's maiden flight.
Prior to the Challenger accident in January 1986, the Shuttle flew 24 successful
missions. These missions exercised the broad range of Shuttle capabilities, including
the deployment of commercial communications satellites and the rescue and repair of
both scientific and communications satellites. In this period, NASA vigorously
pursued the national policy of replacing ELV launches with the Shuttle.
It was decided to replace the Challenger vehicle and to maintain a fleet of four
Shuttles. Henceforth the Shuttle would only fly missions requiring human presence,
unique capabilities of the Shuttle, or to meet national security and foreign policy
goals. Post-Challenger reviews drove numerous changes to procedures for preparing
Shuttles for flight and for determining flight readiness. These new procedures,
coupled with existing launch preparation facilities, the Shuttle fleet size, and routine
planned maintenance led to a steady state launch capacity of no more than twelve
missions per year. Subsequent budget decisions have reduced the planned launch
rate to between six and eight per year.
As these policy changes were evolving and being implemented, significant changes
occurred in the scientific community concerning the design of satellites for
compatibility with different launch vehicles. Due to the decline in the number of
Shuttle launch opportunities, it was now more difficult to manifest a payload on the
Shuttle. This caused a shift away from satellite designs which require launch on the
Shuttle. In addition, technological advances in satellite miniaturization led to a
gradual decline in size and weight of satellites. Missions which may have required
Shuttle launches in the past are now designed to fly on smaller, less expensive ELVs.
The strategy of building a single, very large platform to carry out complex missions
is being gradually replaced by a strategy to use smaller, less expensive platforms
which can be launched on ELVs,_ With less expensive satellites, modem sensors and
data handling equipment, and lower launch costs, it has become more cost effective
to build a satellite without the redundancy required to assure long life. Thus, a
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replacement satellite can be launched to continue the mission if needed rather than
repairing an orbiting satellite using the Shuttle.
The Shuttle will remain a critical part of America's space program for many years to
come. It will be the only means for the United States to place humans in orbit at
least through the year 2005. As such, it will continue to be an integral part of
NASA's program. By the year 1996, a preponderance of Shuttle missions will be
devoted to construction and maintenance of Space Station Freedom. The missions
required by Space Station Freedom could impact the opportunities for unanticipated
missions, such as rescue and repair of deployed payloads.
J
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4.0 SURVEY OF SATELLITE RESCUE/REPAIR OPPORTUNITIES
Several factors must be considered in evaluating opportunities for Shuttle-based
satellite rescue and repair:
• The projected launch rate for satellites over the coming years determines the
pool of candidates for rescue.
• The satellite's orbital inclination must be one attainable by the Shuttle.
• The vehicle or satellite system failure, which created the need for on-orbit
rescue, must have occurred while the satellite was in low Earth orbit at an
altitude within the capabilities of the Shuttle.
• The satellite itself must not violate NASA Shuttle safety requirements.
• The satellite cannot be damaged to the point where repair or rescue costs
preclude any attempts.
These factors act to severely constrain the potential need for satellite rescue and
repair missions in the future.
Most government and private sector near-term estimates of the U.S. and international
commercial launch markets indicate an average of 15-20 satellites available for launch
annually through the year 1996, tapering off to approximately 10-15 spacecraft
annually thereafter. These estimates take into consideration current technological
trends toward larger, more powerful geosynchronous spacecraft and longer on-orbit
service life, as well as improvements in terrestrial communications such as fiber
optics. However, future technological developments could significantly impact these
estimates.
Today, four NASA scientific satellites could be repaired on-orbit: the HST, the
C0mpton Gamma Ray Observatory, the Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer, and the Upper
Atmosphere Research Satellite. Periodic servicing missions are already planned for
the HST, but no servicing missions are planned for the other three spacecraft. Any
known HST repairs are planned to be accomplished during its servicing missions and
were not addressed by the Group Task Force.
Comnierdai communications satellites are most often launched into inclinations
n_fly due eastOf the_launch site. This approach allows:the maximum payload to be
placed into a geosynChronous transfer orbit. The iridinations for scientific payload
launches are largely determined by mission requirements. To become a candidate for
rescue or repair, these satellites must have been launched into transfer or operational
orbi_ with inclinati6ns compatible With the possible Shuttle orbits or capable of being
moved t0:such orbits. From theKennedy SpaCe Center (KSC), the Shuttle is capable
of attaining orbital indinations from 28.5 ° to 57.0 °.
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In identifying candidate missions for rescue and repair, the possible inclinations for
satellite launches and the most likely inclination selected from this range must both
be examined. Table 4.1 shows that this range of inclinations is compatible with
portions of the ranges for most launches of vehicles in use today. The exceptions are
launches into high inclination polar orbits. Excluding these polar orbits, the Shuttle is
capable of reaching the most frequently selected inclinations for all vehicles except
the Titan III and the Ariane. This is particularly significant as over 60 percent of all
commercial satellites are currently launched aboard Ariane boosters.
There are three basic types of failures which prevent a satellite from accomplishing
its mission. First, there are launch vehicle failures which prevent the satellite from
reaching the proper transfer orbit. Second are insertion failures where the satellite
reaches transfer orbit but fails to reach its operational orbit (geosynchronous orbit for
virtually all communications satellites). Third are on-orbit failures where the satellite
reaches its operational orbit, but fails to function or fails soon afterward.
The operational orbits of communications satellites are far beyond the capability of
the Shuttle. A small group of scientific satellites remain candidates after an on-orbit
failure because their operational orbits are within the Shuttle's inclination and
altitude limitations or they can be moved to proper orbits.
Two additional technical factors must be considered. The recent trend away from
Perigee Kick Motors (PKMs) to satellites with integral liquid propulsion systems
could reduce the number of failures which occur in Shuttle compatible orbits. The
second factor is the transition of many satellite requirements away from satellites
using spin stabilization for attitude control tO satellites using a 3-axis control system.
"Spinners" can maintain thermal equilibrium in low-Earth orbit while receiving the
critical power necessary to survive until a rescue/repair mission can be mounted.
Satellites using 3-axis control present greater difficulties. The satellite must either
have abuilt-in safe hold mode which consumes little or no power, or the solar arrays
must be deployed prematurely to maintain satellite health.
A summary of launch vehicle and spacecraft failures from 1970 to 1992 is shown in
Table 4.2. The 42 total failures represent approximately 10 percent of the 406
launches _which occurredduring this 22-year pefiod.,;_e the l_0_!_erfion failures
represent approximately 24 percent of the 42 failUres,_they r_epres6iit 6-nlj/2.5 percent
of the total launches.:i This numberis reduced to approximately101ielpercent if the
satellites launched aboard Ariane to its primary _c_in_ficin are excludedi i _ _....
_Candidates for rescue must also-meet the_standard safe ipolicies, ai%d_equirements
•,for payloads using the Shuttle, These requiremen_ictenfify potential haz,3rds and
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establish requirements for their control. These requirements must be satisfied before
a rescue mission will be accepted for further consideration.
TABLE 4.1 -- LAUNCH AZIMUTHS AND ORBITAL INCLINATIONS
SELECTED U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL
EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES
Vehicle
Shuttle
Delta
Launch Site
KS(:
Cape Canaveral Air
Force Station (CCAFS)
Vandenberg Air Force
Base (VAFB)
Launch Azimuth
44o-110 °
57°-112 °
185°-270 °
Orbital Inclination
(Most Frequent)
28.5°-57.0 ° (28.5 °)
28.7°-51.0 ° (28.7 °)
70.0°-100.0 ° (99.0 °)
Atlas/ CCAFS 90 °-108° 17-0°-44-0° (25"0°)
Centaur
Titan 1II CCAFS 93°-108 ° N/A (26.5 °)
Titan IV CCAFS 93o-108 ° N/A (28.4 °)
VAFB 147°-210 ° N/A (approx. 90o-99 °)
Ariane 0°-108° 5"2°-100"5° (7"0°)Kourou, French
Guiana
Tanegashima, Japan 85°-135 °
N/ABaikonur, Belorus
H-2
Proton
31°-???
51°-:72 o (51.6 o)
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TABLE 4.2 -- HISTORY OF LAUNCH/SATELLITE FAILURES 1970-1992
Type of Failure:
1: Launch failure - vehicle failed during ascent phase and/or spacecraft failed
to reach proper transfer orbit
2: Insertion failure - spacecraft reached transfer orbit but failed to reach
proper geosynchronous Earth orbit - (GEO)
3: On-orbit failure - spacecraft reached GEO but did not become operational
or failed soon thereafter
LAUNCH
DATE
SATELLITE LAUNCH
NAME VEHICLE
TYPE
OF
FAIL.
COULD
BE
RESCUED
BY
SHUTTLE
DESCRIPTION
OF FAILURE
1970
07/23 Intelsat III F8 Delta 2 No Apogee Kick
Motor (AKM)
failure
08/19 Sky-net 1B Delta 2 No AKM failure
11/06 IMEWS 2 Titan 3c 2 No
11/30 OAO B Atlas/Centaur. 1 Yes
Premature
transtage
shutdown
Centaur failure
1971 z
05/08 Mariner-H " Atlas/Centaur 1 _ Yes Centaur failure
10/21 ITOS B Delta 1 Yes 2nd stage
malfunction
1972
1973
07/16 ITOSE Delta 1 Yes
1974
01/19 D_ta 1Skynet 2A
2nd stage
malfunction
Yes 2nd stage
malfunction
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LAUNCH
DATE
SATELLITE
NAME
02/11 Viking/Sphinx
LAUNCH
VEHICLE
Titan 3E
TYPE
OF
FAIL.
COULD
BE
RESCUED
BY
SHUTTLE
No
DESCRIPTION
OF FAILURE
Centaur
ignition failure
1975
02/20
05/20
Intelsat IV F6
DSCS 5/6
Atlas/Centaur
Titan 3C
Yes
Yes
1st stage
malfunction
Booster
malfunction
left spacecraft
(S/C) in too-
low orbit
1976
1977
04/20 GEOS 1 Delta 1 No
09/13
09/29
OTS 1
Intelsat WA F5
Delta No
Atlas/Centaur No
3rd stage
spin-up
malfunction
placed S/C in
subnormal
transfer orbit
1st stage
zexplosion
1st stage
malfunction
1978
03/25
12/07
DSCS 9/10 ........ Titan 3C.
: i 1979
RCA Satcom 3 Delta
1 No
2 No
Centaur failure;
destroyed by
Range Safety .....
AKM
malfunction
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LAUNCH
DATE
SATELLITE
NAME
LAUNCH
VEHICLE
TYPE
OF
FAIL.
COULD
BE
RESCUED
BY
SHUTTLE
DESCRIPTION
OF FAILURE
1980
04/14 Solar Max Delta 3 Yes
05/23 Oscar 9 Ariane 1 1
08/06 FLTSATCOM 5 Atlas/Centaur 3
Malfunctioned
on orbit
(repaired by
STS-41C on
04/09/84)
No Booster failure
No S/C achieved
GEO but not
operational
status
1981
1982
04/10 Insat 1A Delta
09/10 Marecs,B/Sirio-2 Ariane I
1983
3 No
1 ......... No.
S/C achieved
GEO but not
operational
status
Booster failure
....02/03 Westar 6 .................... Shuttle I........................... 2 ...... :
04/04 TDRS-A Shuttle ..... 2 No Inertial Upper
Stage failure
............ (but S/C got to
GEO using
: ........................ :....... .................... thrusters) -
1984
.........Yes .......... Perigee Kick
Motor (PKM)
............. failure .....
; .;_::_ : :;:: : i " :_ : !_':''_'(retrieved by
, , .. _. , _ , STS--51A)
14 '_: ,REPORT-I OFiTHE GROUP TASK FORCE
_,_Survey of Satellite Rescue/Repair Opportunities
LAUNCH
D ATE
02/03
06/09
SATELLITE
NAME
Palapa B-2
Intelsat V F9
LAUNCH
VEHICLE
Shuttle
Atlas/Centaur
TYPE
OF
FAIL.
2
COULD
BE
RESCUED
BY
SHUTTLE
Yes
Yes
DESCRIPTION
OF FAILURE
PKM failure
(retrieved by
STS-51A)
Centaur early
shutdown left
S/C in low
orbit
1985
04/12 Leasat 3 Shuttle 2 Yes PKM failure
(later repaired
by STS-51I)
08/27 Leasat 4 Shuttle 3 No Failed on-orbit
09/06/85
08/28 KH-11 7 Titan 34D 1 Yes Premature 1st
stage shutdown
09/12 Ariane 3 1 No Booster failureSpacenet
F3/ECS-3
1986L
01/28
04/18
05/03
o5/31,
TDRS-B
Big Bird
GOES-G
Intelsat V F14
Shuttle
Titan 34D
Delta
Ariane 2
1987
No
No
No
No
Catastrophic
explosion
1st stage
explosion
Premature 1st
stage shutdown
No 3rd stage
ignition
03/26 FLTSATCOM 6 Atlas/Centaur No Triggered •
lightning;
destroyed by
Range Safety
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LAUNCH
DATE
SATELLITE
NAME
LAUNCH
VEHICLE
TYPE
OF
FAIL.
COULD
BE
RESCUED
BY
SHUTTLE
DESCRIPTION
OF FAILURE
11/21 TVSat-1 Ariane 1 3 No S/C solar
panels failed to
deploy
1988
09/02 VORTEX Titan 34D 2 Yes Transtage
failed to ignite
for 2nd burn
1989
08/09 Hipparcos Ariane 44LP 2 No
06/05 Superbird A AHane44LP 3 No
1990
AKM failure
left S/C in
transfer orbit
(partial
scientific
return)
Thruster stuck _
open in 12/90;
dumped all
S/C GEO
station-keeping
fuel
02/22
03/14
Superbird B/BS- Ariane 44L
2X
Intelsat VI F3 Titan 3
' _: :_ : ,ii _ i
1
No
Yes
1st stage
explosion
Wiring error
left S/C in
sub-transfer
orbit (later
retrieved and
reboosted by
STS-49)
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LAUNCH
DATE
08/28
SATELLITE
NAME
BS-3A
LAUNCH
VEHICLE
H-1
TYPE
OF
FAIL.
3
COULD
BE
RESCUED
BY
SHUTTLE
No
DESCRIPTION
OF FAILURE
Solar panels
damaged in
deployment;
insufficient
power to
operate fully 6
months out of
the year
04/18 BS-3H
1991
Atlas/Centaur 1 No Centaur
ignition failure
Summary of Failures
1 (Launch) 25
2 (Insertion) 10
3 (On-orbit) 7
Total 42
Candidates for Rescue
15
Rescues Accomplished
.; - (
J
Eight of these failures occurred prior to the first Shuttle
launch in April 1981; one of the eight was the Solar Max
satellite which was repairedin 1984. Please note that the
determination of which satellites couldbe rescued by the
Shuttle is based on the best estimates of the Group Task
Force.
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5.0 ECONOMICS OF SATELLITE RESCUE MISSIONS
5.1 Introduction
Public policy with respect to satellite rescue missions cannot be adopted without
consideration of the costs and benefits associated with such missions. Several
categories of costs must be considered:
• Capital costs
• Avoidable costs
• Opportunity costs
• Mission-specific costs
• Social costs
These costs are defined in Appendix 5.A
5.2 Cost Allocation
In many cost categories, the matter of the allocation of joint or common costs can
be critical. While there are accounting guidelines for the allocation of common
costs, there is often more art in it than science. This is especially true for activities
which are not continuous and have a substantial fixed cost component associated
with them. The Shuttle meets these criteria and thus the allocation of costs
becomes one more of policy than of accounting. Nevertheless, the proper
proportion of joint or common costs should be included in any calculation of costs
associated with a rescue.
Table 5.1 summarizes the categories of cost relevant to satellite.rescue attempts; it
also indicates the locus of the impact of such costs. These costs can spread across
a broad spectrum of parties, underscoring the widespread interest in everything
related to the Shuttle and the space program. It also explains why space-related
decisions are, inevitably; political decisions.
5.3 Benefits
The benefits of a satellite rescue can accrue to the public (including NASA) or to
private parties (e.g., the satellite-owners or insurers). It is said, for example, that
the recent Intelsat VI rescue mission provided NASA with insights and experience
that are proving especially valuable in the context of the space station program.
This is particularly noteworthy because reliable simulations of conditions in space
have been elusive. Successful satellite rescues foster popular and political support
for its Shuttle program. Successful satellite rescues mean that space satellites are
18 REPORT OF THE GROUP TASK FORCE
• Economics of Satellite Rescue Missions
being saved, together with at least part of their anticipated value. Anything that
avoids or ameliorates the financial loss encourages future investment in space
endeavors.
Table 5.1 Satellite Rescue Mission Costs and Allocation
Overall Capital
Costs or
Investment
(Sunk Costs)
Mission-Specific
Investments
Avoidable Costs
Mission-Specific
Costs
Social Costs
NASA
X
Other U.S.
Govt
X
U.S. Public
X
U.S. Non-U.S.
Industries Industries
or Firms or Firms
_-
X _
_-
X _b
X _"
X _"
*Depends on Satellite Ownership
5.4 Costs Relevant to Shuttle Rescue Missions
The avoidable cost related to an entire Shuttle mission /represents the appropriate
base from which to cost (although not necessarily to price) Shuttle rescue
missions. The use of avoidable cost eliminates from consideration many sunk
costs, including those related to Shuttle and launch systems development, .
investment made in the total Shuttle fleet and in the entire range of launch and
recovery fadlities. :.........
• .To the: extent that other activities carried 0utduring ithe_same launch and recovery
_Sequence can appropriately bear some of the total launch: costs, the gross
avoidable cost borne by NASA should be reduced. For non-U.S. Government
customers any reduction must be CalcUlated conservatively, ..... "
If there is doubt about the av"6idability of any co_t:element or how to allocate
_: genuinely common costs, it is the satellite rescue that should bear the brunt, given
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the rescues being contemplated by the Group Task Force and given the relatively
modest benefits accruing to the U.S. government and the U.S. public as a result of
such rescues. Every element of costs that would be avoided if the rescue attempt
were not undertaken at all should be added to the overall mission cost.
Rescue attempts clearly add to the risk associated with any Shuttle launch and
recovery. Not only is the risk increased, but the costing of such risk is a difficult
proposition.
Table 5.2 summarizes the discussion as to the elements of cost that need to be
considered before committing to rescues together with suggestions as to how to
allocate those cost elements.
Table 5.2 Cost Elements Appropriate for Pricing Satellite Rescue Missions
Elements Proportion of Cost Allocable to the
Rescue Mission
Full, Long-Run Avoidable Costs of That proportion not reasonably
Shuttle Launch and Recovery allocable to other activities of the
overall Shuttle mission
Rescue-Specific Avoidable Cost 100%
Opportunity Cost Associated with 100%
Displaced Activity
Incremental Risk-Associated Cost 100%
5.5 Pricing Satellite Rescues
It should be recognized at the outset that there is no "automatic" reason why
satellite rescue attempts should be priced strictly on the basis of the cost incurred
in carrying them out. Cost is bedrock; it is not necessarily the only basis for
establishing a price for a rescue. NASA should determine the value of the
attemptto •a customer and to society as closely as it can prior to taking any
positive action with respect to such a prospective attempt, including pricing it.
Satellite rescue pricing policy should be broad enoughto accommodate U.S.
Government agencies and commercial enterprises as well as internation/fl
governments and commerciaI?-dients. A pricing policy option that should be
;;,,:, considered would involve the sharing of risks between the variou s customers and
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NASA. U.S.Government agencieswould pay marginal Shuttle costs for rescue
missions. The commercial and international customers would pay the marginal
costs and all other mission direct cost up front and then upon success of the
mission the customer would then pay a negotiated portion of revenues until the
full cost was paid. This type of pricing policy would provide flexibility to the
Administrator and also enable the customer to make sound business decisions
based on known factors.
- , k_ " _ _ •_ _
.... .c • .... •
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6.0 MISSION PLANNING AND TRAINING
The planning and training phase for a human mission has evolved from the Mercury,
Gemini, and Apollo programs and the earlier Shuttle missions to the present. The
duration of this planning period was significantly extended following the Challenger
accident although the accident was unrelated to the planning and processing
requirements. Currently, NASA has a program to reduce the planning and processing
period while maintaining the safety and integrity of the current processing.
Planning is typically initiated with the signing of a formal customer contract 32
months before launch. The first major milestone is the development of the Payload
Integration Plan (PIP) and its annexes, which define the payload and Space Shuttle
roles and responsibilities, the integration tasks and schedules, and annexes with
specific technical details. This baseline PIP milestone is currently scheduled 22
months before launch. This is followed by the Interface Control Document (ICD)
baseline which, for a standard mission, is scheduled 21 months before launch. These
two requirements are established early in the schedule to provide adequate time to
develop the required technical details, including the physical, electrical, trajectory
design, command, training, and extra vehicular activities. Each Shuttle mission
requires the complete reprogramming of the ascent trajectories due to the variations
in orbital inclination, orbital altitude, and payload constraints. The PIP annexes,
which are produced through working group meetings between the customer and
NASA, are scheduled to be completed between 18 and six months prior to flight.
The six-month date is critical since the flight crew as well as the launch and mission
control teams require this period to complete training for the mission, including
malfunctions, contingencies, and aborts.
Training of an EVA mission specialist covers a similar time period_ however, this
type of training is much more mission-specific. Alternate back-up procedures are
developed for each EVA operation. In addition, during the flight, the ground
facilities at Johnson Space Center (JSC) are prepared to test any modified or new
procedures that are required by situations that develop in real time. These facilities
include the Weightless Environment Training Facility (WETF) and the five degree of
freedom simulator, each of which can simulate most, but not all, of the zero-g space
operations.
The piloting functions for the Space Shuttle are thoroughly simulated and developed
in several facilities. They are rehearsed in the months prior to launch with the teams
at the KSC and JSC, plus in very precise spacecraft simulators at JSC. These simulate
real flight circumstaflces very accurately, and draw on decades of experience in
simulation from civil and military aircraft as well as on prior space programs such as
Gemini and Apollo. Major investments have been made to make the powered flight
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simulations as realistic as possible, including many types of anomalous behavior.
The same degree of fidelity, however, has not been achieved for EVA simulations.
One reason is the impossibility of simulating zero-g for more than about 30 seconds
coupled with the infrequency of EVAs.
However, several of the Earth-based facilities can simulate certain aspects of space
extra vehicular activities. WETF activities allow the astronauts to train in a free
floating mode, but the density and viscosity of water creates different responses to
movement and utilization of equipment. Therefore, another facility is used in which
the astronaut is suspended in air and free-floating satellites are supported on air
bearings to simulate five of the six degrees of freedom. However, it is difficult to
simulate both the mass and the mass moment of inertia about all three axes. In
addition, the air bearing support system for the satellite is not friction free, which
will invalidate some of the training.
Since none of the facilities can duplicate the zero-g space conditions completely,
NASA has had to break up the training for some operations into short sequences that
are tested at different facilities. As each of these facilities afford training in part of
the overall task, they are called "part task trainers". There is no end-to-end high
fidelity simulation with mission control, EVA astronauts, and pilot astronauts
rehearsing the planned and emergency procedures as there is for flight portions of
the missions.
Due to the complexity of the mission planning and training, rescue missions require
more than a year to plan and conduct. This was the case for the Intelsat VI rescue
mission which was initiated in March of 1990 and completed in May 1992. The PIP
baseline data was not finalized until 17 months before launch and the ICD baseline
was established 14 months before launch, both seven months later_than standard.
The late definition of the interfaces resulted in extensive overtime to meet the
schedule launch date. There was no evidence that this led to any reduction in the
training for the mission. _i:_':':_
Training for the Intelsat VI capture operation was conducted in the air bearing facility
rather than the WETF because it provided_a, better, simulation of the dynamics of
capture.- The satellite mock-up w_mounted on the air bearing floor with the
combined mass and_the mass moments,of:inertia about two axes equal to those of the
satellite; but the mass moment of inertia_about the third axis_was much greater than
the actual satellite._ ,The dynamicsof;_e ShUttle orbiter:and the pilot astronaut were
not included in this simulation. This test set up was used to develop and validate
the capture bar design and the capture procedures. Post flight analysis of the test
identified a five pound break out friction in the air bearing simulator. The five
pound breakout friction was sufficient to prevent the satellite from drifting away
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during ground training with the capture bar. In space, the small forces created by
trying to put the capture bar in place resulted in accelerations of the satellite of a few
hundredths of a foot per second per second and thus caused the satellite to drift
away from the astronaut in both capture attempts. In orbit, even five pounds of force
acting on a large satellite for a few seconds can impart linear and angular velocities
large enough to make use of the capture bar difficult or impossible.
The EVA astronauts practiced extensively in the WETF facility at JSC. However, the
principal benefit of these tests is to physically condition the astronauts in a neutral
buoyancy facility. The muscles used under neutral buoyancy are essentially the same
as those used in space, but because of the water resistance, the effort is much greater.
Initially, the water resists movements of both the satellite and the astronaut and can
provide assistance to the astronaut in positioning himself. This phenomena is called
virtual or apparent mass which can be determined because "the kinetic energy of the
solid plus the kinetic energy of the fluid exceeds the kinetic energy of the solid by a
well defined amount. ''2
The only anomalies that occurred during the Intelsat VI rescue mission EVAs were in
the satellite capture phase. Once the satellite was captured and secured in the
payload bay all EVA activities proceeded as planned. A second anomaly occurred in
the release of the satellite from the payload bay by an astronaut inside the Shuttle
cabin. The problems encountered in capturing the Intelsat VI satellite arose, in our
opinion, from the inability to adequately simulate the dynamics in the facilities used
to train for EVA. None of the these training facilities are capable of a realistic
simulation of space operations. Another issue was the failure to make a dynamic
analysis of the process. Adequate training facilities or dynamic analyses would have
uncovered the deficiencies in the capture technique that was used.
: ' • ! : Y
It also appeared that EVA experiences from earlier missions had not been adequately
considered in the design of the Intelsat VI capture technique. These experiences
have, however, produced a better understanding of space simulation facilities, as well
as the problems encountered during space operations, especially when astronauts and
satellite are n0tboth firmly attached to the same structure. Furthermore, even if
more representative facilities are not developed;:the phenomena, once understood,
can most Iikel_;' be avoided by different design approaches _to !the capture. In the case
:_:!0f_tlie:tntelsat VI rescue mission, the capture options were_severely iimitedby the
's/ifell!te_designer, s concern thatonly the thrust ring at its: base;_could be used to
_c_pture.and_attach:it to the Shuttle. when that approachwas not successful, three
..'_£.L_._: L _ ".' ,: _ . ,, _ . .... :_Ci_';_ _ v; ,.
2 See Appendix 6.A.
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astronauts were allowed to grasp the satellite at three points and "muscle" it into the
payload bay.
NASA's ability to perform satellite on-orbit rescue and repair could be significantly
enhanced through the development of improved standard tools, procedures and
training programs. One approach involves the attachment of a special plate to the
orbiting satellite which would be attracted to a magnetic device mounted on the end
of the manipulator arm. Another approach involves the development of a routine
training program for astronauts in rendezvous techniques, remote manipulator
system operations, and EVA operations who would be available to plan and
undertake rescue and repair missions.
The Group Task Force would like to point out that some important lessons were
learned from this mission that could be important in developing Space Station
Freedom, but would note that the rescue mission took time that was planned for
more orderly experimentation designed to support space station development.
Ground simulations of EVA must account for the fact that even very small forces can
cause relative movements in space; thus simulations must be of extreme dynamic
fidelity for two bodies drifting independently in space.
i¸ / •
!i !,
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7.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 Conclusions
1. The opportunities for performing unanticipated satellite rescue or repair in the future
are likely to be rare.
2. The actual time required to prepare for a satellite rescue or repair attempt is mission
dependent and, in the past, has varied from approximately four months to 2.5 years.
3. Previous experience suggests it is difficult to establish a routine approach to
accomplishing these satellite rescue and repair missions.
+ The operational uncertainties associated with unanticipated satellite rescue and repair
missions are such that it is unreasonable to expect that every rescue attempt will
succeed on the first attempt, or at all.
° Previous satellite rescue missions have contributed to the overall knowledge of
extravehicular activities and the associated mission operations. However, this
experience is mission-specific, not easily generalized, and is being lost as experienced
people leave NASA.
° Satellite rescue mission training requirements exceed the existing capability to
conduct integrated training (mission specialist and Shuttle commander combined)
and are limited by the lack of high fidelity simulations and by a lack of training
facilities for each sub-element of the overall activity.
o Representatives of the insurance industry indicate that the small number of rescue
missions, both in the past and forecast, has virtually no impact on the cost of satellite
insurance.
. NASA's past public statements have not adequately communicated the difficulty of
satellite rescue missions, the missions' contributions to accomplishing the overall
NASA mission, or that failure to accomplish specific mission goals does not
necessarily equate to mission failure.
9. NASA's pricing has not recovered the full cost of satellite rescue missions.
10. The Intelsat VI rescue mission lacked an overall mission manager
11. The ability to conduct unanticipated satellite rescue and repair missions is a valuable
and unique national asset. As a unique national asset, the national command
authority may decide an unanticipated satellite rescue and repair mission is
necessary to meet a national or foreign policy objective.
.... • + .........
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7.2 Recommendations
1. The unique ability to accomplish satellite rescue and repair should not be
forfeited.
.
Satellite rescue and repair missions should comply with one or more of the
following criteria:
a. the satellite requiring rescue or repair is a NASA or NASA cooperative
mission.
b. the mission is required to meet national security objectives.
c. the mission is required to meet foreign policy objectives.
d. the mission enables NASA to accomplish U.S. and/or NASA objectives
in a manner whichbenefits the United States and/or NASA.
3. Only those unanticipated satellite rescue and repair missions that produce
genuine benefits to U.S. interests should be considered in view of the inherent
risks to the Shuttle and its crew. These risks include those faced in the rescue
process as well as the intrinsic risk associated with a Shuttle flight.
4. The authority to employ this capability should rest solely with the NASA
Administrator.
Pricing
1. NASA should determine the full cost of Space Shuttle missions in so far as
possible.
2. NASA should charge for unanticipated satellite rescu_e missions as follows:
a. For non-NASA U.S. Government missions, customers should pay
marginal costs
b. For reimbursable missions (i.e., commercial and international),
customers should pay marginal costs and all other direct mission costs
up-front. If the mission is successful, the customer would then pay a
negotiated portion of revenues until the full cost of the rescue is paid.
The price should not include Shuttle replacement, NASA facilities costs,
or facility amortization costs.
c. if the rescueprovides significant benefit to NASA or the U.S.
Government, consideration should be given to sharing costs with the
customer.
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Implementation
1. NASA should continue to ensure that safety requirements are met for
all satellite rescue and repair missions.
. Mission managers should be assigned upon acceptance of a mission.
The mission manager should be responsible for all aspects of pre-flight
mission execution.
3. Mission integrated training is essential for all aspects of Shuttle training.
4. NASA should adequately communicate the inherent complexity of
rescue missions to the public.
° NASA should commit to the maximum use of individuals with previous
experience (both internal and external to NASA) and past lessons
learned to help ensure mission safety and success.
6. NASA should upgrade its EVA capability, including the use of state-of-
the-art EVA tools and training methods.
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APPENDIX 5.A
DEFINITION OF COST CATEGORIES
Capital Costs
The capital costs associated with a rescue grow out of investments which have been
made, often long before the need for the specific rescue arose. Capital costs directly
and uniquely related to the rescue must clearly be booked against that rescue. For
example, in the recent Intelsat VI rescue, the capture bars uniquely designed to deal
with Intelsat VI seem to have been fully costed and charged to Intelsat, as was
entirely proper.
Avoidable Costs
Costs incurred by NASA which would have been avoided but for a rescue attempt
should be assessed against that attempt. For example, if additional EVA time to that
which was planned when the launch was manifested is required solely because of the
rescue, the full cost of that incremental EVA time must be a charge to the rescue
effort.
Opportunity Costs
In some instances it appears that another cost of a rescue is that related to the
opportunities foregone on the overall mission, precisely as a result of substituting the
rescue for other work. The value (opportunity cost) of the foregone efforts should
properly be charged against the rescue; such costs can be extremely high, depending
entirely on the nature of what is foregone to accommodate the rescue. Opportunity
costs seem not to have been a consideration heretofore when NASA has priced
satellite rescue. "
Rescue-Specific Costs
All rescue-specific costs should be booked against the rescue. Such costs fall into two
categories: those which clearly could have been avoided but for the rescue attempt,
and that portion of total Shuttle launch and recovery costs which is directly
attributable to incorporation of the rescue attempt in the total objectives of the overall
mission. An example of rescue-specific costs would be those incurred in providing
astronauts with training which was required only because of the rescue to be
undertaken.
Social Costs
The social costs of the rescue attempt, apart from opportunity costs associated with
opportunities not pursued precisely because of the rescue, are very difficult to
identify prior to the attempt. If the rescue fails, however, there are social costs
associated with the bad light in which the space program, NASA and the United
States are cast. Such costs are borne by society because of the risk inherent in any
rescue attempt. They are difficult, if not impossible to quantify.
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Comments on the Use of Neutral Buoyancy Chambers
to Simulate Orbital Phenomena
Introduction
The use of neutral buoyancy chambers to simulate on orbit extra-vehicular-activities
(EVA) has been a subject of some discussion. All parties seem to agree that it is
possible for a balance of forces to exist. In this case the object is suspended and
looks like a free floating object as observed in orbit. The discussion is related to the
dynamics of the situation and seems to have been centered about the influence of
fluid mechanical drag on the simulation. This is a matter that is resolvable through
analysis, though some ambiguity may possibly exist in terms of the appropriate
representation of the drag coefficient as a function of Reynolds number. This effect
will be discussed in more detail below.
An additional dynamical consideration does not seem to have been discussed at all.
This point relates to the mass and inertial properties of an object suspended in a
neutral buoyancy chamber. Simulation of these properties is more subtle as will be
shown now.
Mass Properties
For the purpose of this discussion we will consider only the initial motion of a solid
from rest. The solid is immersed in an infinite mass of stationary fluid that is
incompressible. We will consider only the initial motion of the fluid following an
impulsive start to the body. By restricting ourselves to the initial motion we can
assume that the motion of the fluid is derivable from a velocity potential. This can
be shown from consideration of the fluid following the impulsive motion of the solid
body TM, and the results given by Schlicting 5 which show the separation point(s) on
cylinders form only after the body has moved a third or so of its radius. Thus for a
short time following the impulsive start of a solid body immersed in a viscous fluid,
the velocity distribution is approximated well by potential flow• At short times, then
the kinetic energy of ttie fluid can be calculated by integration the product of the _
perturbation veloci_;potential and iits derivative normal to the solid's surface over
that surface. The result is that the kinetic energy of the solid plus the kinetic energy
of the fluid exceeds the kinetic energy of the solid by a well defined amount. This
amount is_the:_product_of thedensity ,of the fluid, the volume of the body, and a
n_umeri_al_factor._The ;product is called_the apparent mass.;iThe numerical factor is
thus dete_ned-&om the::additionalkinetic energy, This factor is dependent upon
the shape._f ctlie solid, 'and :ranges3n value from one for,flow normal to an infinitely
long _ircul_cylinder_t0zero for flow_along the long axis of the cylinder. The factor
is 0.5 for _i_$_h_fe. _The,values of_this factor are listed in Table 1 below for axially
symmetricShapes.::_In Table 1 the factor kn :applies for motion along the long axis of
a slender cylinder and,k 2'applies to the cross flow. The factor _ corresponds to the
factor applied: to,the moment of'inertial when the body;is rotated ,about an axis that
is nbrmal to its 10ng axis. __Note the inertial factor_is identically zero when the solid is
rotating about its long axis. The apparent mass for a disk moving normal to itself is
the product of the fluid density, the volume of a sphere whose radius equals the
radius of the disk, and the number 0.63 (actually two divided by pi). Clearly the flow
around sharp corners adds greatly to the apparent mass.
Table 1
Inertia Factors of Ellipsoids of Revolution for Axial Motion, Lateral Motion
and Rotation.
a/b
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.51
2.99
3.99
4.99
k 1
0.500
0.305
0.209
0.156
0.122
0.082
0.059
0.500
0.621
0.702
0.763
0.803
0.860
0.895
0.000
0.094
0.240
0.367
0.465
0.608
0.701
a/b
6.01
6.97
8.01
9.02
9.97
OO
k 1
0.045
0.036
0.029
0.024
0.021
0.000
0.918
0.933
0.945
0.954
0.960
1.000
0.764
0.805
0.840
0.865
0.883
1.000
To proceed further it is useful to show values of several mass parameters of satellites
that have been retrieved during Space Shuttle missions. These properties are shown
in Table 2.
Table 2
Satellite Mass and Volume Properties
Satellite Weight VOlume Density Specific Reciprocal
pounds cu.ft, slugs/cu.ft. Gravify
Intels at 08961 1607.2 0.173 0.089 11.24
Syncom 15316 2129.5 0.220 0.113 08.85
Westar 07307 0360.3 0.630 0.324 03.09
Palapa 07670 0353.0 0.675 0.675 02.87
Solar Max 04956 _ 0363:3 0.420 _ _-_0.216 ,04.63
The question from these results,is dear. Is it possible to design a geometrically
similar model of the solid _body_ to simulate_orbital dynamics in, the neutral buoyancy
chamber? The sum of the solid's, mass,and its; apparent mass will:exceed the :mass
encountered_dtiring the EVA.:_Th_e mass of :the satellite under neutraLbuoy_ancy_, :_,,
ranges from2.87to 11.24 times :its actual mass, the mass factor is taken to be,O.5.
then the total mass of the satellite: model in the.neutral buoyancy chamber ranges ::
from 3.3 to 16.86 times the real:mass of the satellite. The same kind of factor will be
found for the moments of inertia. Thus one must work much harder in the neutral
buoyancy chamberto both accelerate and decelerate the solid body than one would
in an EVA if drag were not a factor: (This observation about ,the differences :between
the on orbit and the neutral buoyancy chamber was reported to members of the
Group Task Force on Satellite Rescue and Repair by Astronaut David Leestma at
Johnson Space Center on 6 July 1992)
The only way in which the mass plus the apparent mass can simulate reality is for
the satellite to be much denser than the fluid in the neutral buoyancy chamber. One
should note that the perception of the error will be less as the piece is smaller. Thus
a one pound piece that would react as if it is 1.5 pounds presents virtually no
problem. The same can not be said of a satellite that is six feet in diameter, and six
feet long whose density is, say, one-third of water.
Effects of Fluid Mechanical Drag
To return to the issue of the effects of fluid mechanical drag. The kinetic energy
possessed by the solid after it moves a distance x from its initial position in response
to a constant force, F, is
PSCax
_ F/n
- )
Note the mass, m, is the total, or actual plus the apparent mass of the solid. The
density, p, is the density of the fluid in the neutral buoyancy chamber. It is easy to
show that in the limit as the drag coefficient, assumed constant here, approaches zero
the kinetic energy is just equal to the work done, i.e., Fx. The error in kinetic energy
due to drag is just
OO
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It is easy to show that when the error is small, the fractional velocity error is
V
The position error due to drag is more difficult to calculate since it involves an
apparently unexplored transcendental function,
In this case
m
If we take a two term approximation to the integrand, i.e., x is small, we find an
approximate solution
F,-1-oos( O
T/I
This approximate solution is important for two reasons. First the proper
non-dimensional time comes out naturally, and second the distance is measured in a
scale determined by the loss in velocity due to drag. What actually happens is easy
to describe. When the force is the same, at a given time the effect of drag is to cause
the body to move a shorter distance than it would if the drag were zero. The
fractional distance that is lost can be computed from a series expansion, namely
•
x rn 2 3.4 m2 5.6
This result is very interesting, for it shows that in a neutral buoyancy chamber, the
effects of drag are partially balanced by the square of the (increased) mass of the
satellite. Consequently, if one is simulating the properties of a low density satellite in
a neutral buoyancy chamber, the trajectories could be surprisingly accurate due to the
combination of the drag and the apparent mass for a timely interval near the start of
the motion. However, the drag causes the body to slow more quickly than in orbit.
Summary
The dynamic scaling of solid bodies in a neutral buoyancy chamber to simulate the
same object during EVA in orbit,_ only possible when the body has a density
somewhat greater if/an the fluid in the neutral buoyancy chamber. The effects of
apparent mass do in fact mitigate the loss in accuracy due to fluid mechanical drag.
However, the amount of work done in accelerating, decelerating or moving an object
in a neutral buoyancy chamber is excessive in comparison to that done in orbit while
drag acts to slow a coasting body in water much work quickly than in air. Except for
the physical conditioning achieved by full time task simulation, the technique
developed in a neutral buoyancy chamber that are to be applied in on orbit activities
may prove to be unreliable.
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